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Northern Ireland: Teenagers’ Perspectives 
Abstract 
Although preceded by years of political and policy developments, the signing of the 
Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast Agreement) in 1998 is, generally, regarded as 
marking the end of conflict and the beginning of the transition to peace.  However, this 
transition has been neither linear nor straightforward. Divisions, both physical and 
symbolic, reflecting collective identities and ‘otherness’ remain resistant to change and 
continue to foster sectarianism, mistrust and outbreaks of violence. Despite some 
positive change, not least of which is the absence of sustained violence, the majority of 
neighbourhoods and schools remain either Protestant or Catholic.  Drawing on data 
from the Young Life and Times (YLT) survey, an annual attitudinal survey of 16-year 
olds in Northern Ireland that has been running since 2003, this article explores what 
young people’s perspectives reveal about the complexities and the challenges involved 
in transitioning to a more shared society. Where relevant and possible, their attitudes are 
compared with those expressed by adults in the annual Northern Ireland Life and Times 
(NILT) survey. A primary focus on tracking teenagers’ attitudes is important for a 
number of reasons.  While often regarded as a ‘post conflict’ generation segregation and 
polarisation remain features of teenagers’ everyday lives and the political landscape.  
Children and young people are one of the four key strategic priorities in the latest 
government strategies to build united communities and achieve change and are 
embedded in the Programme for Government 2016–2021. If these government 
commitments are to be realised the voices of young people must become central rather 
than peripheral.  It is important, therefore, that their opinions are not only sought, but 
interrogated and feed into policy. 
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Introduction 
Since the signing of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement (hereafter called the Agreement) 
in 1998, enhancing community cohesion and building a shared future have been central 
to numerous government strategies and policies in Northern Ireland (OFMDFM, 2005; 
2010; 2013). While the underpinning policies, language and emphasis have evolved and 
changed the promotion of community/good relations, attained through greater sharing, 
reconciliation, understanding, regeneration and mutual respect are central (McVeigh, 
2014). Undoubtedly these notions exert a powerful and appealing rationale; yet the fact 
that the progress of the peace process has been neither linear nor straightforward attests 
to the inherent difficulties in interpretation and implementation by political 
representative, communities and individuals. Given the complex and contested history of 
Northern Ireland this uneven progress is hardly surprising; while the divisions between 
communities are reflected in macro structural forces (religion, ethnicity, politics, class) 
they are also underpinned by everyday relationships and communal identities rooted in 
symbols, traditions, cultures and territory that both bond and divide (McKnight & 
Leonard, 2014).  
 
Drawing on the Young Life and Times (YLT) survey, a long-running ARK 
(www.ark.ac.uk) attitudinal survey of 16-year olds in Northern Ireland, this article seeks 
to shed some light on these complex issues. Attitudinal change is explored in terms of a 
number of key survey questions on identity, belonging, culture and symbols, sharing and 
mixing, and past and future perceptions of community relations. We discuss what these 
complex and, at times, contradictory responses might tell us about the progress of the 
ongoing peace process and the policies of community/good relations that accompany it, 
and how ethno-national identities and the political and culture values, symbols and 
dispositions attached to these while not immutable remain difficult to erode. While 
increased levels of immigration to Northern Ireland have created a more diverse society, 
with the benefits and challenges of this being reflected in both everyday life and 
government policy, this articles explores continuity and change through the narrower 
‘two community’ lens.  
Admittedly surveys are not without limitations, presenting only a ‘snapshot of public 
mood’ (Morrow, 2015), while being unable to capture the layers of meaning that can lie 
behind a particular response (Devine, 2014). However, as these ARK surveys contain not 
only a number of time-series questions on community/good relations but also a range of 
questions that have been asked regularly over the life of each survey, they can offer 
unique insights. Moreover, in response to political and social change new questions may 
be introduced where salient. 
 
The article opens with a brief overview of the Northern Ireland conflict and draws 
attention to how understandings of collective identity and of difference are embedded in 
competing notions of tradition, culture and territory. Beginning with the Agreement, the 
discussion focuses on the development and vulnerabilities of strategies and policies 
implemented to embed the peace process and promote community/good relations. It then 
draws on relevant annual ARK survey data to explore attitudinal continuity and change 
and closes with a discussion of how future policy framework in relation to 
community/good relations may develop. 
 
Overview of the conflict and peace process 
Northern Ireland has a long and contested history of political and religious discord 
underpinned by structural inequalities and religious and ethno-national segregation in 
housing, employment, education and social activities (Coulter, 1999; Tonge, 2002). 
While from its inception, sporadic episodes of violence erupted between 
Catholic/nationalist and Protestant/unionist communities, the late 1960s saw the 
beginning of three decades of conflict on an unprecedented scale and intensity.  During 
this period, commonly referred to as ‘The Troubles’, around 3,700 people were killed 
(McDowell, 2007), and, dependent on the definition applied, 40,000 to 100,000 were 
injured (Breen-Smyth, 2013), while tens of thousands of people were displaced due to 
intimidation and political violence (Mesev, Shirlow & Downs, 2009).  In response to this 
violence and fear a range of, initially makeshift, structures and barricades were erected, 
most notably between working class Protestant and Catholic neighbourhoods in Belfast, 
to keep the two communities apart.  Over the duration of ‘The Troubles’ many of these 
barriers became permanent and, despite the transition to a more peaceful society, a range 
of ‘peace walls’, particularly in Belfast, continue to divide many of these communities 
(McKnight & Leonard, 2014). This continued sense of territoriality, identity, belonging 
and ‘othering’ is reinforced through the flying of flags, Irish or British (sometimes 
Palestinian or Israeli), the painting of kerbstones to reflect allegiances to these flags, wall 
murals depicting iconic events or symbols and a range of festivals and parades (McKnight 
& Leonard, 2014; Rolston, 2003; Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006); while informal territorial 
boundaries, easily missed by the ‘outsider’, abound. The thirty years of ‘The Troubles’ 
solidified and extended already existent residential and social segregation, bolstered 
sectarianism and increased attachment to or abhorrence of particular neighbourhoods, 
cultural traditions and symbols.  Thus, “while the state border is ‘now almost invisible… 
[and] crossing is essentially an anonymous act” (Diez & Hayward, 2008, p. 53),  an 
observation that may be challenged as a result of the Brexit vote, “the same cannot be 
said of the myriad borders – physical, cultural and mental that remain features of everyday 
life for many people living in Northern Ireland” (McKnight & Leonard, 2014, p. 167).  
 
While the conflict is often portrayed as being between Catholics/nationalists and 
Protestants/unionists, this fails to capture the complex interweaving of religion, contested 
territorial allegiances and competing identities, local and national, that continue to play 
out in Northern Ireland (Devine & Robinson, 2014; Hayes & McAlister, 2013).  While 
not primarily about religion, in terms of religious practice, many people in Northern 
Ireland derive a sense of belonging and identity from the contested memories, traditions, 
symbols and rituals that are linked to religion and competing nationalisms (Mitchell, 
2006; O’Dowd & McKnight, 2015).  Identities are important as they “structure a range 
of political and social attitudes and values that impact on voting choices, housing and 
schooling and what counts as ‘culture’” (Devine & Robinson, 2014, p. 3). While neither 
binary nor immutable they may, particularly in a region such as Northern Ireland, be 
resistant to change.   
 
While sustained violence has subsided and Belfast is now a popular tourist destination, 
competing nationalisms remain, arguments over parades, flags and territory endure, and 
“culture wars” continue to play out in public space (Wilson, 2016, p. 145) in both 
everyday encounters and periodic contentious events.  It has long been recognised that, 
“Culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language” 
(Williams, 1983, p.87). This assertion is particularly relevant in ethno-nationally divided 
societies such as Northern Ireland, where culture is used to contrast, justify or vilify 
identities and traditions.  Notions of collective culture, identity and belonging are bound 
up in a range of emotional and intangible dimensions and attachments, that, if noticed at 
all, to the outside eye may appear irrational or negative. However, these “emotional 
attachments to symbols, traditions, place and power create and sustain meaning even if 
to others their continued significance no longer exists” (McKnight & Leonard, 2014, p. 
177). 
 
One of the most overt and contested displays of culture is parades, and, while only a few 
lead to violence, their authenticity as communal ‘cultural’ celebrations is differently 
understood between and within communities. To some they represent a ‘way of life’ and 
a demonstration of their cultural tradition, while to others they are sectarian or 
triumphalist (Komarova & McKnight, 2013).  More widely, in everyday encounters and 
the “micropolitics of everyday life” (Amin, 2002) the retention of murals and the flying 
of flags, which remain a feature of life, creates a ‘chill factor’ and restricts everyday 
access and movement, creating a sense of safety and belonging to some and alienation to 
others (Shirlow, 2003).  Indeed, within the competing discourses of good relations, shared 
space, transformation, sectarianism, equality and diversity attempts to dismantle both 
physical and symbolic barriers can be seen as threats to traditions and identities and, as 
such, allegiances to these may become more entrenched.  Furthermore, efforts to build 
good relations, both within and between communities, and create a sense of belonging 
and identity that all citizens can subscribe to and/or respect are undermined by residual 
paramilitary violence (Wilson, 2016).   
Community Relations and Good Relations Policy 
The Agreement recognised the political rights of both communities and established a 
range of political institutions, most notably an Assembly with a power-sharing Executive. 
However, as Todd (2015, p. 11) notes “while lengthy and detailed and giving each party 
most of their key aims it left many crucial elements thin … which allowed for agreement, 
but meant that implementation would be crisis-ridden”. Some would argue that the 
difficulties of creating transformative public policy are undermined by consociational 
frameworks put in place by the Agreement, as while the main political groupings continue 
to reflect sectarian divisions there is little encouragement for new allegiances or identities 
to emerge (Dixon, 2012; Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006; Wilford and Wilson, 2003).  
However, while acknowledging difficulties, others argue that critics place too much 
emphasis on the inflexibility of identities (Nagle, 2012), and suggest that consociational 
framework “can provide a future that is free of division if not difference” but that this 
demands ‘constructive political conduct’ (McGarry & O’Leary, 2006: 250).  
 
After ongoing consultations, in 2005, under direct-rule, A Shared Future (ASF) policy 
document on good relations was produced. While having much to recommend it, the 
differing approaches to issues of, for example, equality, culture and identity held by the 
two major political parties – Sinn Fein (Catholic/nationalist) and the Democratic Unionist 
Party (Protestant/unionist) ensured it remained vague. As Komarova (2008, p. 19) 
succinctly notes, “… [it] dances around and hints at but it never quite articulates in detail 
the link between ‘identity’, ‘culture’, ‘celebrating differences’ and ‘good relations’ in a 
democratic society”.  Its subsequent shelving in 2007 highlights the divisive nature of 
notions of sharing.  A further consultation document Programme for Cohesion, Sharing 
and Integration issued in 2010 was widely criticised. In May 2013 Together: Building a 
United Community (T:BUC) was published with change being mapped against four 
strategic priorities – children and young people, shared community, safe community, and 
cultural expression.  Its vision is to build ‘a united community based on equality of 
opportunity – the desirability of good relations and reconciliation – one which is 
strengthened by its diversity, where cultural expression is celebrated’ (T:BUC, 2013: 3).  
Underpinning this document is the notion that building a ‘united community’ starts at 
local level, focuses on children and young people with key planks being the dismantling 
of interface barriers and the creation of shared school campuses and shared 
neighbourhoods (Hayward, Dowds & Shaw, 2014, p. 1). While there has been some 
limited progress in relation to the dismantling of ‘peace walls’, it has been argued that the 
attitudes of people living near ‘peace walls’ have hardened somewhat since 2012 (Byrne 
et al., 2015).  In relation to shared campuses opinion remains divided some seeing any 
sharing as a positive step, with others feeling it dilutes earlier assurances of integration 
(Wilson, 2016).  
  
As the preceding discussion highlights, the young people who are the primary focus of 
this article have grown up in a society marked by positive changes, not least of which is 
the reduction of sustained violence. However, concomitantly, much discursive and 
physical space continues to be occupied or claimed in terms of ‘them’ and ‘us’ and, 
directly and indirectly, this impacts on the lives and attitudes of young people, most 
particularly those living in socio-economic deprived areas. Despite the backdrop of 
‘normality’ that has followed the Agreement, educational and residential segregation 
remain, sectarian geographies which curtail or dictate spatial practices and opportunities 
persist, and for some young people sporadic inter and intra community violence and 
threats from paramilitary groups are features of their everyday lives (Brown and Dwyer, 
2014; McAlister, Haydon, Scraton, 2013; McKnight and Leonard, 2014).  Moreover, as 
Browne and Dwyer (2014, p793) highlight, underlying structural and social problems of, 
for example, poverty, marginalistion, poor mental health and low educational attainment 
can mean that for some young people growing up in the “new” Northern Ireland remains 
both challenging and dangerous.’ Despite the move to a more peaceful society, the 
legacies of the past linger and embedded structural inequalities can, to varying degrees, 
impact on how young people interact with and make sense of the society in which they 
live.  
Empirical data 
YLT is an annual postal survey undertaken in Northern Ireland since 2003. A random 
sample of 16-year olds is drawn from the Child Benefit register. Everyone with birthdays 
in February and March, and registered with Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’ 
(HMRC) Child Benefit Register is invited to take part. Thus the sample size varies 
slightly each year, and in 2016 1,009 16-year olds took part in the YLT survey.  
Whilst YLT has surveyed 16-year olds on a range of issues that are relevant to their lives, 
questions on community relations have been included annually with a set of core 
questions being repeated each year, allowing us to monitor attitudes over time. Tracking 
young people’s attitudes is important for two main reasons: Firstly, unlike many adults 
today’s 16- year olds today have grown up in a society where, as Wilson (2016, p. 143) 
suggests, the “politico-military conflict has morphed into a politico-cultural one”. Thus, 
attitudes and experiences of young people are good indicators of how the peace process 
has impacted on their sense of belonging and national and cultural identities. Secondly, 
children and young people are one of the four strategic priorities in the Programme for 
Government in Northern Ireland 2016 - 2021, and significant investment has been made 
and will be made by government to build united communities and achieve positive 
attitudinal change. It is important, therefore, that young people’s opinions are sought, 
interrogated and fed into policy. Where appropriate we make comparisons with findings 
from the Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) survey, an annual attitude survey 
among adults in Northern Ireland. NILT grew out of the Northern Ireland Social Attitude 
(NISA) surveys which were first undertaken in 1989. Both NILT and YLT are now used 
as indicators in government good relations policies. 
Perception of community relations over time 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
 
Figure 1 shows how the proportion of adults and young people, since 1989 and 2003 
respectively, who think relations are better than 5 years ago has changed over time. When 
assessing the survey data improvements and deteriorations in perceptions are evident and 
these can be seen to coincide with the stability/instability in the power sharing institutions 
or particularly contentious disputes. For example, in 2001, after a build-up of local 
tensions, the Catholic Holy Cross Primary School situated in an interface area in Belfast 
was picketed by Protestant protestors and images of terrified school children made news 
not only in Northern Ireland but around the world. More recently in 2012, a decision by 
Belfast City Council to fly the Union Flag on government buildings on specific days 
rather than every day provoked severe disruption and violence, in which young people 
were often involved. Figure 2 shows the time series data of perceptions that adults and 
16-year olds have had about the future of community relations. The lines in both figures 
are similar which would indicate that the anticipation of future relations is a good 
indicator for current relations.  
As noted, the yearly changes in these two Figures may be affected by particular political 
events around the time of the fieldwork. However, continuously monitoring attitudes also 
reveals the progress made in a long-term political process, as substantial incidents and 
events lose their significance over time and general trends become more visible; this is 
where the Life and Times data is particularly strong. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show that amongst adults optimism about community relations has 
significantly increased over time. Whilst in 1989 only 22 percent of adults surveyed 
thought that community relations were better than they had been 5 years earlier, in 2015 
the proportion who felt this had more than doubled (52%) . Although representing a 
decrease from the high point in 2007 (64%), the long-term trend is that adults are now 
much more optimistic about community relations than they were in the late 1980s.  
However, if a trendline was drawn from 1998 to 2015, this line would be almost perfectly 
horizontal. Unsurprisingly, attitudes to future relations were also most positive when the 
first ceasefire was declared and when the Agreement was signed with, as Figure 2 shows, 
hitting a low point in 2001 when the devolved institutions collapsed. Time series analysis 
shows a significant increase in optimism about future community relations since 1989; 
however, from 1998 (62%) to 2015 (46%) the trend is actually downwards. 
Young people’s attitudes 
 
Plotting the attitudes of 16-year olds against those of the adults shows that in almost all 
years since 2003, young people’s attitudes to community relations were more negative 
than those of adults. Figures 1 and 2 show that 16-year olds’ perceptions were markedly 
less positive with regard to perceptions about future relations, and in some years (2005, 
2006 and 2009), there was a 14 percentage point gap between them. However Figures 1 
and 2 also show that in the last three years, attitudes have become more similar, and from 
2012 to 2014 the level of optimism among adults and 16-year olds has been basically the 
same. 
Figures 3 and 4 compare the attitudes to community relations among 16-year olds over 
time in relation to respondents’ religious backgrounds. The figures evidence that when 
the time series started, 16-year olds from Protestant backgrounds were significantly less 
likely than their Catholic counterparts to say that community relations are better than 5 
years ago and will be better in 5 years’ time. There is extensive academic discussion 
around a perceived sense of alienation and pessimism within Protestant communities as 
they adjust to the political and social transitions required by an Agreement whereby many 
feel they ‘lost out’. The reasons underpinning these negative feelings are complex and 
disputed, and it is suggested that they may reflect a sense of loss of power in the political 
arena, a dilution of a sense of ‘Britishness’, a diminution of the freedom to express their 
culture and heritage, and a fracturing of Protestant communities due to both macro-
economic changes and intra community disputes (Mac Ginty, & Du Toit, 2007; Patterson, 
2012; Southern, 2007). 
However, Figures 3 and 4 show that the views of Catholic and Protestant 16-year old have 
become more similar. In 2015 approximately four in ten 16-year olds said that community 
relations will be better in 5 years’ time, which is only a very slight and statistically 
insignificant increase in respondents answering this way compared to 2003.  
Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here 
Perhaps the more significant change is that the proportion of 16-year olds who felt that 
community relations are worse now, or will be worse in 5 years’ time has decreased since 
2003 (Figure 5).  In 2015 only about one in ten respondents (9%) thought that relations 
were worse than 5 years previously, and an even smaller proportion (6%) felt that 
relations would be worse in 5 years’ time, compared to the 17 percent and 15 percent 
respectively who gave these responses in 2003. Again, Figure 5 clearly shows the impact 
of notable political events and incidents on the opinions and perceptions of young people, 
as the higher level of scepticism around the time of the flag protests in 2013 clearly 
demonstrates. 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
 National and religious identities and a sense of belonging 
The figures presented so far offer two insights. Firstly, attitudes to community relations 
among 16-year olds are positive, but not as positive as perhaps might be expected from a 
‘post-conflict’ generation. However, it would be naïve to assume that these young people 
can ‘automatically jettison the contested memories, histories, cultures, practices and 
processes that fuelled/fuels violence’ (McKnight and Leonard, 2014: 176). Attitudinal 
change requires more than the reduction of sustained violence, and, as noted above, many 
divisions and suspicions remain or have taken on a new complexion in the period since 
the signing of the Agreement (Brown and Dwyer, 2014). For some young people the 
dividends of peace are limited as they continue to live in politically divided, economically 
and socially deprived and physically depressed communities. Moreover, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, adults who had experienced years of violence may, in comparative terms, 
judge change more favourably and are, thus, more positive in their assessments.  
Nonetheless, what is also evident is a process of slow convergence both between adults’ 
and young people’s views and also between Catholic and Protestants.  
At this point, we turn our attention to national and religious identity. A strong relationship 
between the two can be seen as a proxy measure for the strength of identification with the 
Nationalist/Catholic or Protestant/Unionist communities. The YLT and NILT time series 
data shows that there has been little substantial change in how Catholics and Protestants 
see themselves in terms of their national identities. The vast majority of Catholics retain 
an Irish national identity whilst over two thirds of adult Protestants feel British. A growth 
in the proportion of adults and young people adopting ‘Northern Irish’ as a national 
identity could be interpreted as an indicator that people are increasingly content with the 
constitutional settlement and accept Northern Irishness as a national identity in its own 
right; however, especially amongst adults, there is little evidence of this happening.  In 
2003, one quarter of both adults (24%) and 16-year olds (25%) identified as Northern 
Irish. In 2015, this was virtually the same for adults (26%), whereas the proportion of 16-
year olds identifying as Northern Irish had increased over time to 37 percent. However, 
this increase was predominantly due to the fact that in 2003 only one third (33%) of 16-
year old Protestants identified as Northern Irish whereas in 2015 half (50%) did. During 
the same period there was only a five-percentage point increase among 16-year old 
Catholics who identified as Northern Irish (16% and 21% respectively). Thus, a Northern 
Irish identity remains a more acceptable term for Protestants than Catholics, which may 
reflect the origins of Northern Ireland. While, as NILT data shows, Catholics may not 
desire a united Ireland they find it easier to identify with Irishness, indicative, perhaps, of 
the range of emotional, ephemeral attachments to ideas of nationhood as opposed to 
territory. The demographic shift, but also the greater equality that young Catholics in 
Northern Ireland experience compared to their parents and grandparents generation may, 
however, result in a greater sense of belonging to Northern Ireland. 
Table 1 however shows that there is still a significant difference between Catholics and 
Protestants in relation to their sense of belonging to Northern Ireland. For both adults and 
young people the sense of belonging to Northern Ireland was significantly stronger 
(p=0.002) among those who identify as British or Northern Irish, however, 80 percent of 
adults and 70 percent of 16-year olds who feel Irish also expressed a definite or probable 
sense of belonging to Northern Ireland. This would suggest that whilst the connection 
between Britishness and Northern Ireland remains much stronger, Irishness and Northern 
Irishness are not mutually exclusive identifications. 
More striking, however is the much weaker sense of belonging to Northern Ireland among 
16-year olds (Table 1).  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Markers and symbols of national and cultural identity 
The months-long protests and unrest by Loyalist communities that followed Belfast City 
Council’s decision in December 2012 to fly the Union flag over the Belfast City Hall on 
18 designated days, rather than every day, was a stark reminder that the importance of 
flags, murals and kerbstone paintings as markers of national and religious identity in 
Northern Ireland.  Kelly (2014) showed that following the 2012 flag protests, there was 
a significant increase in the perception among both Catholic and Protestant NILT 
respondents that there were more murals and flags on display than five years previously. 
Having said that, whilst the flag protests in 2012 mobilised significant numbers of 
Loyalist protesters, our surveys reveal that the level of intimidation experienced by 
respondents through republican or loyalist cultural markers of identity has significantly 
decreased over time, as shown in Table 2. The level of intimidation expressed was higher 
among 16-year olds than adults, perhaps because young people tend to be less self-
assured, but also because they are more visible and thus self-conscious, for example, 
when they wear school uniforms or sports tops that identify them as a member of the 
Catholic or Protestant community. In 2015, around one third (35%) of Catholic YLT 
respondents said they felt intimidated by Loyalist murals, kerb paintings or flags, whilst 
one in five (19%) 16-year old Protestants said they had felt intimidated by Republican 
murals, kerb paintings or flags. However these figures were much higher in 2003 (54% 
and 35% respectively) when YLT data was collected for the first time, as Table 2 shows.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
In general, the 2013 YLT and NILT survey show that around half of 16-year olds (49%) 
and four in ten adults (42%) adults supported flying of flags on lampposts throughout 
Northern Ireland on special dates for particular celebrations. Support for this was much 
larger among Protestant 16-year olds (65%) and adults (53%) than Catholic 16-year olds 
(38%) and adults (32%). Less than one quarter of 16-year olds (23%) but half of adults 
(49%) said they wanted all the flags removed from lampposts straight away, even if this 
caused trouble. Catholics were much more likely than Protestants to answer that way 
(YLT: 35% and 10% respectively; NILT 57% and 40% respectively). 
Shared spaces 
The concept of ‘shared space’ remains an important element of community/good relations 
policies and strategies. However, understandings of what shared space should/could 
entail are complex.  At one level, shared space may be understood as neutral space devoid 
of markers of identity, while, at another level, it may be seen as space where people can 
actively engage with each other and recognise and respect difference.  The idea of shared 
space is thus tied to dismantling territorial, emotional and symbolic barriers.  However, 
experiences and perceptions of a particular space as, for example, 
neutral/shared/safe/unsafe are not static as social and political forces can impact on 
perceptions; thus the discourses and policies of sharing need not necessarily be matched 
by attitudinal change. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Table 3 shows that the majority of adults and young people regard many public places in 
their neighbourhoods as definitely shared and open. The only notable difference between 
adults and 16-year olds is that 91 percent of adults, but only 84 percent of young people 
regard local parks as definitely or probably shared and open spaces. 
Protestant 16-year olds were generally more likely than their Catholic counterparts to say 
that these places in their neighbourhoods were definitely shared and open, and these 
differences were statistically significant for parks, leisure centres and libraries. Further 
analysis shows that Catholic 16-year olds who live in mainly Catholic residential areas 
are least likely to say that public places are definitely shared and open in their 
neighbourhoods. For example, 56 percent of Catholic respondents who live in mainly 
Catholic neighbourhoods said that parks in their neighbourhood were definitely shared 
and open compared to 69 percent of Catholics who lived in mainly Protestant areas.  For 
leisure centres these figures were 61 percent and 75 percent respectively. This suggests 
that differences in perceptions among young Catholics and Protestants are due to 
Catholics living in single identity areas feeling that the facilities, especially parks and 
leisure centres, are probably not shared with Protestants. Nolan (2013, p. 119) reported 
an increasing self-desegregation in residential areas, but said that this was almost 
exclusively self-desegregation in one direction, namely an increasing proportion of 
Catholics living in predominantly Protestant residential areas. The YLT data suggests that 
these Catholics experience the facilities in these areas as largely shared.  
Sharing facilities and spaces, and higher levels of contact and mixing are crucial factors 
for improved community relations. A previous analysis of YLT data (Schubotz & 
Robinson, 2006) showed that integrated education and participation in cross-community 
projects are indeed related to more positive attitudes to community relations and a more 
favourable disposition towards further mixing. Since then Shared Education has been 
initiated and the Shared Education Act (Northern Ireland) was passed in 2016. 
OFMDFM/The Executive Office has also committed significant financial resources to the 
Together: Building a United Community Initiative (T:BUC), which includes resources 
for cross-community summer schemes.  
Since 2003, the proportion of 16-year olds who have no friends from the other religious 
community has decreased by about two thirds from 33 percent to 12 percent, and the 
proportion who never socialise with someone from the other religious community has 
almost halved (19% and 11%). Furthermore, whilst in 2003 around half of YLT 
respondents said all of their friends had the same ethnic background as themselves, this 
figure was just one quarter in 2015. But how does increased contact relate to attitudes?  
Preferences for mixing and integration 
Monitoring preferences for mixed religion environments is another important aspect of 
ARK’s time series research. There is an ongoing debate academically, but also among 
policy makers and the public, whether mixed religion environments are conducive to a 
society coming out of conflict or whether there is room for single-identity environments, 
and if so, what impact these have on relationships (McGlynn, Zembylas, Bekerman, & 
Gallagher, 2009; Niens, Cairns, & Hewstone, 2003; Power, 2011). Economically a 
duplication of public services and spaces is unsustainable, so it is important to make sure 
that public spaces, such as schools, parks, leisure centres and libraries are run and 
experienced as shared spaces that people from different backgrounds feel happy and safe 
using.  
Figure 6 shows the proportion of adults and young people who think that neighbourhoods, 
workplaces and schools should be mixed-religion environments. Generally, the Figure 
shows that opinions in relation to religious mixing are remarkably stable. We can see that 
across all three domains, 16-year olds tend to be slightly less in favour of religious mixing 
than adults. However, we can also see that whilst adults’ views have hardly changed over 
time, 16-year olds in 2015 were slightly more favourable towards religious mixing in 
neighbourhoods and schools (62% and 54% expressing this preference) than their 
counterparts in 2003 (53% and 48% respectively).  In fact, in relation to schools, in 2015, 
YLT respondents were for the first time just as favourably disposed to religious mixing 
as adults, whilst in the other two domains adults remain more in favour of mixing than 
16-year olds although the gap in attitudes has been narrowing.  
Insert Figure 6 about here 
However, the main message from the data is that in relation to schooling and 
neighbourhoods, a much larger proportions of adults and young people prefer religiously 
mixed settings than experience these in their lives. Over nine in ten respondents continue 
to live largely segregated neighbourhoods and attend largely segregated schools whilst 
seven in ten adults and six in ten 16-year olds would prefer religiously mixed 
neighbourhoods, and over half of adults and 16-year olds prefer mixed religion schools. 
Conclusions 
Recent discussions about attitudes to community relations and sharing have increasingly 
raised concerns about the views of young people. Although some young people are 
strongly of the opinion that it is the older generations’ responsibility and duty to adopt 
and pass on less sectarian messages, which apparently are alien to the younger generation 
and their ambitions, the Life and Times data had consistently shown that it is 16-year olds 
who harbour more negative views. The reasons for this are undoubtedly complex and 
nuanced, and while difficult to unpick fully in a survey potential explanations have been 
offered. One reason is that young people growing up in post-conflict Northern Ireland 
have a different baseline from which they assess community relations. Although elements 
of the conflict, including a level of paramilitary control, still exist, in particular in those 
working class areas which have been affected most by sectarian violence, most 16-year 
olds have grown up without experiencing sustained violence and sectarian conflict. 
Nonetheless, the structural, emotional and physical challenges faced by some young, 
particularly those from socio-economic disadvantaged communities remain stark.  
Perhaps it is understandable, therefore, that adults are more sensitive to positive change 
in community relations than young people. However, the gap between the views of adults 
and young people has been decreasing which, perhaps, indicates that a reasonably stable 
peace process is increasingly being experienced similarly by adults and young people.  
The majority of both adults and young people express positive attitudes towards mixing 
and integration, and again the gap in attitudes between adults and young people appears 
to be closing slowly over time. With a further stabilisation of the Peace Process, it can be 
expected that the changes in attitudes will be more difficult to measure as, predictably, an 
increasing proportion of respondents among adults and young people will say that 
relations are about the same. Perhaps, it is therefore more useful to monitor the proportion 
of people who think relations are getting worse, as this could be the best indicator for 
assessing increasing or decreasing dissatisfaction. 
The data presented in the second part of this article show very clearly that there is very 
little evidence to suggest that efforts to continue with programmes that encourage formal 
mixing or integration should be compromised. While acknowledging the difficulties of 
promoting more positive relationships between and perceptions of ‘the other community’ 
(see Cummings et al 2011), and that greater contact between groups will not automatically 
produce more positive attitudes, nonetheless the survey results indicate that increased  
contact is  related to more positive attitudes. This is particularly the case for young 
Protestants, and, perhaps, this increasing level of contact and integration has contributed 
to the more positive views about community relations that young Protestants hold now 
compared to when data collection started in 2003. There is an increase in the number of 
Catholics who now live in what used to be traditionally Protestant residential areas. Our 
data show that they largely experience spaces as shared in these neighbourhoods. The 
flip-side of the demographic shift in Northern Ireland is that increasingly it is Catholics 
who experience segregated living and segregated schooling. The number of Catholics 
attending de-facto Protestant state-controlled schools has increased over the last two 
decades, whereas, with a few exceptions, the majority of Catholic Maintained schools are 
still attended almost exclusively by Catholic pupils. This highlights the importance of 
integrated and shared education initiatives, as for many Catholic young people who live 
in predominantly Catholic areas and attend Catholic schools, these initiatives provide 
valuable opportunities to mix and form friendships with their counterparts from 
Protestant, other or no religious backgrounds.  
  
References 
Amin, A. (2002). Ethnicity and the Multicultural City: Living with Diversity. 
Environment and Planning A, 34, 959-980. doi:10.1068/a3537. 
Breen-Smyth, M. (2013). Injured and disabled casualties of the Northern Ireland conflict: 
issues in immediate and long term treatment, care and support. Medicine, Conflict and 
Survival, 29, 244-266. dx.doi.org/10.1080/13623699.2013.815436.  
Browne, B. & Dwyer, C. (2014) Navigating Risk: Understanding the Impact of Conflict 
on Children and Young People in Northern Ireland. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 
37(9), 792-805. dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.931213 
Byrne, J., Cathy Gormley-Heenan,C., Morrow, D., & Sturgeon, B. (2015). Public 
Attitudes to Peace Walls 2015 Survey Results. Jordanstown: Ulster University. 
Coulter, C. (1999). Contemporary Northern Irish Society. London: Pluto Press. 
Cummings, M.E., Merrilees, C.E., Schermerhorn, A.C., Goeke_Morey, M.C., Shirlow, 
P. & Cairns, E. (2011) Longtitudinal Pathwyas Between Violence and Child Adjustment: 
The Role of Emotional Security and Community in Northern Ireland. Journal of 
Abnormal Child Psychology, 39, 213-224. DOI 10.1007/s10802-010-9457-3. 
Devine, P. (2014). Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey: Monitoring Change in 
Diverse Societies, Shared Space, 18, 24-32. Available at http://www.community-
relations.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Northern-Ireland-Life-and-Times-Survey-
Monitoring-Change-in-Diverse-Societies-.pdf.  
Devine, P., & Robinson, G. (2014). From survey to policy: community relations in 
Northern Ireland, Sociological Research Online, 19. Retrieved from 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/19/1/27.html. 
Diez, T., & Hayward, K. (2008). Reconfiguring Spaces of Conflict: Northern Ireland and 
the Impact of European Integration. Space and Polity, 12, 47-62. 
dx.doi.org/10.1080/13562570801969432. 
Dixon, P. (2012). The politics of conflict: A constructivist critique of consociational and 
civil society theories. Nations and Nationalism, 18, 98-121. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-
8129.2011.00503.x 
Hayes, B., & McAlister, I. (2013). Conflict to peace. Politics and society in Northern 
Ireland over half a century. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Hayward, K., Dowds, L., & Shaw, C. (2014). Belonging and Alienation in the new 
Northern Ireland.  Retrieved from 
http://www.ark.ac.uk/publications/updates/update93.pdf  
Kelly, G. (2014). Flying the Flag? An update on attitudes to markers of identity in 
public space. Retrieved from www.ark.ac.uk/publications/updates/update92.pdf.  
Komarova, M. (2008). Shared Space in Belfast and the Limits of a Shared Future 
(Divided Cities/Contested States, Working Paper No. 3). Retrieved from 
www.conflictincities.org/workingpapers.html. 
Komarova, M., & McKnight, M. (2013). ‘We Are Watching You Too’: Reflections on 
Doing Visual Research in a Contested City. Sociological Research Online, 18(1). 
Retrieved from http://www.socresonline.org.uk/18/1/19.html.  
McAlister, S., Haydon, D., & Scraton, P. (2013). Violence in the Lives of Children and 
Youth in “Post-Conflict” Northern Ireland. Children, Youth and Environments, 23(1), 1-
22. DOI: 10.7721/chilyoutenvi.23.1.0001 
McDowell, S. (2007) Who are the victims? Debates, concepts and contestation in 'post-
conflict' Northern Ireland. Derry/Londonderry: CAIN. Retrieved from 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/victims/introduction/smcd07whoarethevictims.html. 
McGarry, J., & O'Leary, B. (2006). Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland's Conflict, 
and its Agreement 2. What Critics of Consociation Can Learn from Northern Ireland. 
Government & Opposition, 41, 249-277. doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2006.00178.x 
Mac Ginty, R., & Du Toit, P. (2007). A disparity of esteem: Relative group status in 
Northern Ireland after the Belfast Agreement. Political Psychology, 28, 13-31. doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-9221.2007.00549.x 
McGlynn, C., Zembylas, M., Bekerman, A., & Gallagher, T. (2009). Peace Education in 
Conflict and Post Conflict Societies: Comparative Perspectives. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
McKnight, M., & Leonard, M. (2014). Bordering in Transition: Young People’s 
Experiences in ‘Post Conflict’ Belfast. In S. Spyrou, & M. Christou (Eds), Children and 
Borders (pp. 164 – 182). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
McVeigh, R. (2014). Good Relations in Northern Ireland: Towards a Definition in Law. 
Belfast: Equality Coalition. Retrieved from 
http://www.caj.org.uk/files/2015/12/08/GOOD_RELATIONS_IN_NI-
_TOWARDS_A_DEFINITION_IN_LAW_Oct_2014.pdf.  
Mesev, V., Shirlow, P., & Downs, J. (2009). The Geography of Conflict and Death in 
Belfast, Northern Ireland. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 99(5), 
893-903. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20621258.   
Mitchell, C. (2006). Religion, Identity and Politics in Northern Ireland: Boundaries of 
Belonging and Belief. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 
Morrow, D. (2015). Mixed Messages: Community Relations in 2014. Retrieved from 
http://www.ark.ac.uk/publications/updates/update105.pdf 
Nagle, J. (2012). The Repositioning of Irish Nationalism in Northern Ireland. 
(Ethnopolitics Papers, Paper No. 21). Retrieved from  
https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/page-files/EPP021_0.pdf   
Niens, U., Cairns, E., & Hewstone, M. (2003). Contact and Conflict in Northern Ireland. 
In O. Hargie, & D. Dickson, D. (Eds.), Researching The Troubles: Social Science 
Perspectives on the Northern Ireland Conflict (pp. 123-140). Edinburgh: Mainstream 
Publishing. 
O’Dowd, L. & McKnight, M. (2015) Urban Intersections: Religion and Violence in 
Belfast. In L. O’Dowd, & M. McKnight, (Eds.), Religion, Violence and Cities (pp. 97 – 
115). London and New York: Routledge. 
OFMDFM (Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minster) (2005). A Shared 
Future: Improving Relations in Northern Ireland. Belfast: OFMDFM. 
OFMDFM (Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minster) (2010). Programme 
for Cohesion, Sharing and Integration, Consultation Document. Belfast: OFMDFM. 
OFMDFM (Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minster) (2013). Together: 
Building a United Community (TBUC). Belfast: OFMDFM 
Patterson, H. (2012). Unionism after Good Friday and St Andrews. The Political 
Quarterly, 83, 247-255. Retrieved from 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-923X.2012.02298.x/epdf  
Power, M. (Ed.) (2011). Building Peace in Northern Ireland. Croydon: Liverpool 
University Press. 
Rolston, W.J. (2003). Drawing Support 3: Murals and Transition in the North of Ireland. 
Belfast: Beyond the Pale. 
Schubotz, D., & Robinson, G. (2006). Cross-community integration and mixing does it 
make a difference?  Retrieved from 
http://www.ark.ac.uk/publications/updates/update43.pdf 
Shirlow, P. (2003). Who Fears to Speak: Fear, Mobility and Ethno-sectarianism in the 
Two Ardoynes. The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 3(1), 76-91. 
dx.doi.org/10.1080/14718800308405159. 
Shirlow, P., & Murtagh, B. (2006). Belfast: Segregation, Violence and the City. London: 
Pluto Press. 
Southern, N. (2007). Protestant alienation in Northern Ireland: A political, cultural and 
geographical examination. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 33, 159-180. 
Retrieved from dx.doi.org/10.1080/13691830601043588. 
Tonge, J. (2002). Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change. London: Prentice Hall. 
Todd, J. (2015). Northern Ireland: Timing and Sequencing of Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction and Peacebuilding (Centre for Research on Peace and Development, 
Working Paper No. 39). Retrieved from https://soc.kuleuven.be/crpd/files/working-
papers/working%20paper%20Todd.pdf. 
Williams, R. (1983). Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Wilson, R., & Wilford, R. (2003). Northern Ireland: A route to stability. Swindon: ESRC. 
Wilson, R. (2016). The Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring (Report Number Four). 
Belfast: Community Relations Council. 
  
Figure: 1  Proportions of adults (NISA, NILT) and 16-year olds (YLT) 
believing that relations between Protestants and Catholics are better 
now than 5 years ago (%) 
 
Sources: NISA (1989-2000); NILT (2001-2015); YLT (2003-2015) 
Note on missing data: In 2011 NILT was not conducted due to lack of funding. 
 
Figure 2:  Proportions of adults (NISA, NILT) and 16-year olds (YLT) 
believing that relations between Protestants and Catholics will be 
BETTER in 5 years’ time (%) 
 
Sources: NISAS (1989-2000); NILT (2001-2015); YLT (2003-2015) 
Note on missing data: In 2011 NILT was not conducted due to lack of funding 
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Figure 3:  YLT respondents saying relations between Protestants and Catholics 
are BETTER now than five years ago by religious background (%) 
 
Source: YLT (2003-2015) 
Figure 4:  YLT respondents saying that relationships between Protestants and 
Catholics will be BETTER in five years’ times. By religious background (%) 
 
Source: YLT (2003-2015) 
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Figure 5:  YLT respondents saying that relationships between Protestants and 
   Catholics are WORSE now or will be WORSE in five years’ 
times (%) 
 
Source: YLT (2003-2015) 
Table 1: Respondents’ sense of belonging to Northern Ireland by their 
national    identity 
 % 
NILT YLT 
British Irish Northern 
Irish 
British Irish Northern 
Irish 
Definitely 56 39 57 35 22 32 
Probably 29 41 31 47 48 48 
Probably not 9 10 7 9 14 10 
Definitely not 5 7 4 3 7 3 
Don’t know 1 3 1 7 9 7 
 
Sources: 2015 NILT and YLT surveys 
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Table 2:  Proportion of NILT and YLT respondents who felt intimidated by… 
 % 
NILT Catholics NILT Protestants YLT Catholics YLT Protestants 
2003 2015 2003 2015 2003 2015 2003 2015 
…Republican 
murals, kerb 
paintings or flags 
12 6 29 10 14 5 35 19 
…Loyalist murals 
kerb paintings or 
flags 
23 19 19 12 54 35 15 8 
Sources: 2003 and 2015 NILT and YLT surveys 
 
 
Table 3:  Proportion of respondents who regard the following spaces as 
shared and open between Catholics and Protestants 
 % 
NILT YLT 
Definitely Probably Definitely Probably 
Leisure Centres 69 20 70 20 
Parks 69 22 61 23 
Libraries 73 20 70 20 
Shops 76 19 71 23 
Sources: 2015 NILT and YLT surveys 
 
 
 Figure 6: Proportion of adults and 16-year olds who express a preference for mixed-
religious environments 
 
Sources: NILT (2003-2015); YLT (2003-2015) 
Note: In 2011 NILT was not conducted due to lack of funding 
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